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COMMENT
WHENCE AND WHITHER THE MERE EVIDENCE RULE?
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the
government may not seize a person's property if its sole interest
in that property is its use as evidence.1 Generally only fruits or
instrumentalities of a crime, weapons which an arrestee might
use to escape, and property the possession of which is a crime
may be seized.2 This restriction on the power of the government
to seize is known as the "mere evidence" rule. The Court has
held that seizure of mere evidence is a violation of the fourth
amendment, and its admission is a violation of the fifth. It has
also indicated that the fifth amendment's prohibition against
forced self-incrimination forbids the seizure itself, if the things
seized are private papers, and that the fifth amendment is a
guide to what is meant by the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4
Whether the mere evidence rule is based upon the fifth
amendment, the fourth amendment, or both, it may now be bind-
ing on the states,5 for both amendments apply to them. Applica-
bility of the rule to the states is of particular interest in Louisi-
ana, where the prohibition against seizing mere evidence has not
been recognized. The new Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"A Judge may issue a warrant authorizing the search for
and seizure of anything within the territorial jurisdiction of
1. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). It appears to this writer
that application of this rule may be limited to cases in which the search in the
course of which the seizure was made was without a warrant, incidental to an
arrest, or under a warrant not describing the thing which was seized. For scholarly
examinations of the questions concerning the Supreme Court's statement of the
mere evidence rule see LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TME FOURTHI
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATEs CONSTITUTION 133-36 (1937); Fraenkel,
Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 378-87 (1921) ; Shellow,
The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and Seizure of Evi-
dence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964) ; Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evi-
dentiary" Objects-A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 319
(1953) ; Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and The Reason, 54 Gao. L.J. 593
(1966).
2. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). There may be
other interests which the state may assert in order to seize the thing, since the
list given by the court does not purport to be exclusive, but what these interests
would be is as yet unknown.
3. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio,




"(3) May constitute evidence tending to prove the com-
mission of an offense."
and
"A peace officer making an arrest shall take from the
person arrested all weapons and incriminating articles which
he may have about his person."'
To determine the possible effect of the mere evidence rule on
the administration of criminal justice by the states, this Com-
ment will examine the origin of the rule, the types of searches
and seizures to which it applies, the rationale behind the rule,
and its constitutional basis.
Development of the Rule
Drawing upon English history and the fifth amendment to
interpret the fourth amendment requirement that searches and
seizures be reasonably executed, the Supreme Court evolved the
mere evidence rule. Observance of the rule's restriction upon
what may be seized became necessary as a result of the Supreme
Court's reading Entick v. Carrington,8 an English case, into the
Constitution.
In 1765 the British Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, issued
a warrant for the arrest of an English clerk, John Entick, who
was suspected of writing seditious pamphlets. The warrant also
commanded a general search of all of the clerk's papers. Entick
brought an action for trespass against the messengers of the
Crown who executed the warrants and seized his books and
papers. The messengers raised the authority of the warrant in
defense. Lord Camden of the Court of Common Pleas found
that no statute authorized the type of search and seizure Entick
suffered, and that at common law all searches and seizures were
trespasses, except those conducted to find stolen property. He
noted that even a search for stolen property was a trespass
unless the stolen goods were actually found, and denied that
seizing a man's private papers was analogous to seizing stolen
goods. He refuted the argument that a general search of a man's
6. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 161 (1966).
7. Id. art. 255.
8. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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papers ought to be allowed in the case before him because it
would be useful by pointing out that no law authorized search
for evidence of offenses much more secret than libellingY In
dictum Lord Camden did draw an analogy between the prohi-
bition of searches for evidence and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 10 Lord Camden traced the practice of issuing
general warrants to the ill-famed court of Star Chamber.1" Hos-
tility of English-speaking peoples to searches and seizures dates
back to the early seventeenth century. The right to issue general
warrants was claimed as part of the king's "absolute preroga-
tive," 12 which the common lawyers in Stuart times were deter-
mined to render less than absolute.13
In Wilkes v. Wood, decided by the King's Bench in 1765,
Lord Mansfield held illegal a general warrant not specifying the
person to be seized. 14 Wilkes and Entick appear to have inspired
the fourth amendment's requirement that a warrant specify
the persons or things to be seized." General warrants, called
writs of assistance, commanding officers of the Crown to search
any place for smuggled goods were frequently issued in the
American colonies.' 6 The writs were used to aid enforcement of
oppressive trade laws implementing Britain's economic policy of
mercantilism, which "protected" the British West Indies at the
expense of the North American colonies.' In 1761 a group of
9. Id. at 1074: "If, however, a right of search for the sake of discovering
evidence ought in any case to be allowed, this crime above all other ought to be
excepted, as wanting a discovery less than any other."
10. id. at 1073: "It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accule
himself; because tle necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon
the innocent as well as the guilty, would ,be both cruel and unjust; and it should
seem that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too
tile innocent would be confounded with the guilty."
11. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1069 (1765).
12. See 2 MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 254-62 (1863).
13. See BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE, (1957) for an excellent account
of the conflict between the common lawyers and the early Stuart kings with regard
to the prerogative.
14. 19 How. St, Tr. 1075 (1765).
15. See discussion in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. See LASSON, THE 1HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT 51-78 (1937).
17. Id. at 51-52. See also SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 558-59 (Modern
Library ed.) : "The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish,
or at least, to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the en-
joyment and industry of all those nations in general and of the American colonies
in particular. It is a d.ead weight upon the action of one of the great springs
which puts in motion a great part of the business of mankind. By rendering the
colony produce dearer in all other countries, it lessens its consumptions, and
thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the enjoyments and the
industry of all other countries, which both enjoy less when they pay more for
what they produce. By rendering the produce of all other countries dearer in
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merchants obtained a hearing before the Superior Court of Mas-
sachusetts on the legality of the writs of assistance."' The court
eventually found the writs legal, 19 but not before James Otis,
attorney for the merchants, aroused a revolutionary fervor
against the warrants.20 Otis contended general warrants were
not authorized by statute, but if they were, the statute was un-
constitutional. He called writs of assistance "the worst instru-
ment of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty,
and the fundamental principles of law that ever was found in
an English law book. '21 Thus hostility to general searches in
America antedates the American Constitution. Resentment
against the writs led to the fourth amendment's requirement
that the place to be searched be specified in the warrant.22
In 1886 the Supreme Court decided Boyd v. United States, 23
which read Entick v. Carrington24 into the Constitution. The
case arose out of an action to have property declared forfeit to
the government for nonpayment of duties. The statute estab-
lishing the forfeiture proceeding permitted the court to require
the defendant to produce any business book, invoice, or paper
belonging to him or under his control. Defendants complied with
such an order under protest that obtaining evidence by that
means was unconstitutional. The jury found for the United
States, and the goods were declared forfeit. The Supreme Court
reversed. Finding the proceeding quasi-criminal, it applied the
fourth and fifth amendments, stating that the issue was whether
"a search and seizure, or what is equivalent thereto, a compul-
sory production of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence
against him ... is . . . an 'unreasonable search and seizure' with-
the colonies, it cramps, in the same manner, the industry of all other countries,
and both the enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It is a clog which,
for the supposed benefit of some particular countries, embarrasses the pleasures,
and encumbers the industry of all other countries; but of the colonies more than
of any other."
18. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
57 (1937).
19. Id. at 62.
20. See id. at 59, where the author quotes John Adams on the latter's reaction
to Otis's oratory: " 'I do say in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Otis's oration
against the Writs of Assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life.' He
'was a flame of fire! Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go
away, as I did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there
was the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then
and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years, namely in 1776, he grew
to manhood, and declared himself free.'
21. Ibid.
22. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
23. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
24. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
[Vol. XXVII
COMMENTS
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution ?,25
The Court held, "a compulsory production of the private books
and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such
a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and
is the equivalent of . . . an unreasonable search and seizure
S.. within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. '2
Justice Bradley's reasoning in the Boyd opinion draws heav-
ily upon Entick v. Carrington, as being deemed by the drafters
of the fourth and fifth amendments "the true and ultimate ex-
pression of constitutional law."' 27 The Court stated: "Any forci-
ble and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or
to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judg-
ment. ' 28  Although no actual search of Boyd's property was
made, the principles of Entick v. Carrington29 "affecting the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security" were deemed
applicable. These principles "reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court . . .; they apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employes of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property, where that right has never been forfeited
by his conviction of some public offence, - it is the invasion of
this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of
Lord Camden's judgment."30 "Breaking into a house and open-
ing boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation,"' but
the principles of Entick forbid much more.
Justice Bradley's opinion incorporates the principles of En-
tick into the fourth and fifth amendments. In effect Boyd estab-
lishes that these amendments elevate the common-law rule
against a paper-search to the level of a constitutional imperative.
Whereas in Entick the seizure was illegal because unauthorized
25. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 022 (1886).
26. Id. at 634-35.
27. Id. at 622.
28. Id. at 630. (Emphasis added.)
29. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
30. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
31. Ibid.
1966]
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by statute, in Boyd the statute authorizing the seizure was in-
valid because it contravened a principle of the higher law.
Boyd v. United States enunciated no fixed rule that all mere
evidence is immune from seizure. It held only that the govern-
ment could not seize a man's private papers; "even the act under
which the obnoxious writs of assistance were issued did not go
so far as this. ' 32 Nor did the Court hold that the only reason-
able seizures were those allowed at common law. It implicitly
recognized that the Constitution permitted some statutory ex-
pansion of the class of things subject to seizure.33
Not until 1921, in Gouled v. United States,34 did the Supreme
Court hold that mere evidence per se is immune from seizure.
Gouled was a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United
States. Warrants were issued authorizing seizure of certain con-
tracts used to bribe an officer of the United States and some
papers used to commit the felony of conspiring to defraud the
United States.3 5 In the course of the searches, three documents
not used to commit crimes were seized - an unexecuted con-
tract with Lavinsky,3 an executed contract with Steinhal, 37 and
32. Id. at 623.
33. See id. at 623-24, where the Court gives examples of things other than
stolen goods that may -be seized. Although the seizure of smuggled goods was not
authorized by common law, the Court said such a seizure could be reasonable.
34. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
35. Id. at 307: "Of these papers, the first was seized in defendant's office
under a search warrant, dated June 17, and the other two under a like warrant
dated July 22, 1918, each of which was issued by a United States Commissioner
on the affidavit of an agent of the Department of Justice. It is certified that it
was averred in the first affidavit that there were in Gouled's office 'certain prop-
erty, to wit: certain contracts of the said Felix Gouled with S. Lavinsky [which]
were used as a means of committing a felony, to wit: . . . as means for the
bribery of a certain officer of the United States.' It is also certified that the
second affidavit declared that Gouled had at his office 'certain letters, papers,
documents and writings which ... relate to, concern and have been used il the
commission of a felony, to wit: a conspiracy to defraud the United States.' Neither
the affidavits nor warrants are given in full in the certificate, but no exception
was taken to the sufficiency of either."
The warrants evidently simply referred to the description of the things to be
seized in the affidavits. See Gouled v. United States, 264 Fed. 839, 840 (2d Cir.
1920). The things seized were not included within the descriptions, because they
were not used to commit felonies.
36. Id. at 310. Of that document the Court said: "The government could
desire its possession only to use it as evidence against the defendant aind to search
for and seize it for such purpose was unlawful."
37. Ibid. Of the Steinhal contract the Court said it could easily imagine
how such a paper could have been used in committing a crime, "so that it [the
government] would have a legitimate and important interest in seizing such a
paper in order to prevent further frauds." However, since the facts did not show
that it was used as an instrumentality in committing the crime, and since the
question certified to the Supreme Court stated that the document was "of evi-
dential value only" the Court held the seizure of the executed contract also illegal.
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a bill for legal services.38 The court found seizure of all three
documents illegal.
The Court answered the question of whether the seizures vio-
lated the fourth amendment in the affirmative.3 9 It held that
search warrants:
''may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's.
house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a crim-
inal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to
only when a primary right to such search and seizure may
be found in the interest which the public or the complainant
may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful
and provides that it may be taken." 0
The Court held the introduction of the papers in evidence would
violate the fifth amendment: "[T] o permit them to be used in
evidence would be, in effect, as ruled in the Boyd Case, to com-
pel the defendant to become a witness against himself."'41 Gouled
gave little reasoning to support the Court's conclusion that the
seizure violated the fourth amendment. In Boyd the Court held
the seizure of the papers was unreasonable because it would, in
effect, force Boyd to testify against himself in contravention of
the fifth amendment. The Court in Gouled relied on the fifth
amendment merely to proscribe the introduction in evidence of
things which it had already determined were seized in violation
of the fourth.
Gouled extended the mere evidence rule beyond Boyd to pro-
scribe the seizure of things other than papers. 42 Since objects
other than papers generally do not communicate the thoughts
38. Ibid. Of the bill for legal services the Court said the public could be in-
terested in it ",only to the extent that it might be used as evidence," hence the
seizure of it was also illegal.
39. Id. at 311. The question was: "Are papers of no pecuniary value but
possessing evidential value against persons presently suspected and subsequently
indicted under sections 37 and 215 of the United States Criminal Code, when
taken under search warrants issued pursuant to the Act of June 15, 1917, from
the house or office of the person suspected- seized and takeu in vidation of the
Fourth Amendment?" Id. at 309-10.
40. Id. at 309.
41. Id. at 310.
42. Id. at 309: "There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from
other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only
they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property
may be seized."
1966]
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of one accused, the fifth amendment, which is designed to pro-
tect such communications, 43 cannot serve as a rationale for a
mere evidence rule extended to protect more than papers. How-
ever, the Court formulated no rationale in Gouled to buttress the
weakened self-incrimination justification.
In United States v. Kirschenblatt44 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals invoked the mere evidence rule to bar seizure of
mere evidence during a search of premises under the control of
an arrestee, where the search was made incidental to a lawful
arrest. Although the searchers had a valid search warrant, it
did not specify the papers they seized. The United States claimed
the seizure was nonetheless valid because it occurred in the
course of a search incidental to arrest. The Court recognized
that it is legal to search an arrestee's person and seize any rele-
vant evidence that may be found, and that one may search the
immediate premises where a person is arrested and seize contra-
band found there.45 However, it ruled that one may not properly
seize mere evidence found on the premises.
Judge Learned Hand stated: "While we agree that strict con-
sistency might give to a search of the premises incidental to
arrest, the same scope as to a search of the person, it seems to
us that result would admit exactly the evils against which the
Fourth Amendment is directed." 6 The court cited Entick v.
Carrington as directed against "a practice which English-speak-
ing peoples have thought intolerable for over a century and a
half - the general search warrants. '47
43. See Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826, 1830 (1966) : "We hold
that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature."
44. 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
45. Id. at 203: "It is true that the law has never distinguished between docu-
ments and other property found upon the person of one arrested. All may be used
in the trial, so far as relevant .... While the point was not involved, the language
in Weeks v. U.S. was broad enough to cover it. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has very recently held that, upon an arrest, the immediate premises may be
searched for contraband, . .. . just as a vehicle may be searched, . . . and as
officers, once in under a search warrant, are not confined to the contraband
specified in it."
46. Ibid.: "Whatever the casuistry of border cases, it is broadly a totally dif-
ferent thing to search a man's pockets and use against him what they contain,
from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him, once you
have gained lawful entry, either by means of a search warrant or by his consent."
47. Ibid.: "After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among
his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indis-
tinguishable from what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the war-




Judge Hand indicated that the reason for the mere evidence
rule lies more in history than in policy: "Such constitutional
limitations arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their
makers have suffered, and should go pari passu with the sup-
posed evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the depth
and toughness of their roots in the past. '48 However, he hinted
that the rule may be important in protecting political liberty,
for although it might appear fair to search for mere evidence
against a bootlegger, such a search "may take on a very differ-
ent face" if used by the government against political oppo-
nents.
49
In Marron v. United States, which arose a year after Kirsch-
enblatt, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the mere
evidence rule was applicable to seizures during searches inci-
dental to arrest.50 However, the Court construed the class of
things seizable broadly to favor the government, ruling that
bills for gas, electricity, telephone, and water were "so closely
related to the business, it is not unreasonable to consider them
as used to carry it on,"'" and therefore they were not mere evi-
dence.
In 1932 the Supreme Court applied the mere evidence rule
to hold illegal the seizure of papers only slightly different from
the papers in Marron. In United States v. Lefkowitz 2 the court
found that the papers seized were "unoffending" and not subject
to seizure, whereas the similar things seized in Marron had been
used "to carry on the criminal enterprise."53 Attempting to dis-
tinguish the case before it from Marron, the Court looked to in-
dicia of a general search present in Lefkowitz, but absent in
Marron. The Court pointed out that the ledgers and bills seized
in Marron were not found during a general search, but were in
plain sight of the officers making the arrest, whereas in Lefko-
witz "the searches were exploratory and general and made solely
to find evidence of respondents' guilt."" Lefkowitz focuses at-
tention upon the intent of the searchers as well as the nature
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) : "They had a right without a warrant contem-
I)orancously to search the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry
on the criminal enterprise."
51. I bid.
52. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
53. Id. at 465.
54. Ibid.
1966]
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of the thing seized: "The decisions of this court distinguish
searches ... merely to get evidence to convict ... from searches
such as those made to find stolen goods." The interpretation
given the mere evidence rule in Lefkowitz tends to make the fact
that the thing seized is mere evidence just one variable to be
weighed in determining whether the seizure is reasonable. The
Court cited Go-Bart Co. v. United States as controlling, where
it was said: "There is no formula for the determination of rea-
sonableness. Each case is to be determined on its own facts and
circumstances." 56
One lower federal court has interpreted Lefkowitz so as to
merge the mere evidence rule with the general, more flexible,
requirement of reasonableness. "The line between fruit of the
crime itself and mere evidence thereof may be narrow;" said
the court, "perhaps this turns more on the good faith of the
search than the actual distinction between matters turned up. ''57
However, in Harris v. United States the Supreme Court stated
the mere evidence rule in a fashion which makes it clear that
one looks to the nature of the thing seized rather than to the
intent of the searchers:
"This Court has frequently recognized the distinction be-
tween merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which
may not be seized either under the authority of a search war-
rant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and
on the other hand, those objects which may be validly seized
including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime
is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property,
weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be
effected, and property the possession of which is a crime." 8
The search in Harris was incidental to an arrest under a war-
rant charging defendant with forgery. Agents arresting Harris
conducted a search of his apartment for checks used as instru-
mentalities of the crime. They found several draft cards, and
the defendant was convicted of the unlawful possession, conceal-
ment, and alteration of these. The court held that possession of
the cards was a continuing crime, and therefore seizure of them
was not illegal.
55. Ibid.
56. 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
57. Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943).
58. 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
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Application of the Rule
Determining whether something seized is mere evidence nec-
essarily involves a decision as to a thing's relation to the crime
charged. 9 Since the facts of cases vary infinitely, it is to be ex-
pected that decisions as to whether particular kinds of property
are mere evidence will also vary.
In Abel v. United States the Supreme Court, finding the
cases construing the mere evidence rule apparently impossible
to reconcile, decided to follow the more recent ones favorable
to the government.6 0 The narrow construction given the rule
is well illustrated by the recent case of Schmerber v. California1
in which the Supreme Court established that the mere evidence
rule does not protect an individual against a compulsory blood
test, on the ground that the rule protects only property.62 In
general, the courts have given the rule a narrow application by
broadly construing the categories of things subject to seizure.
Fruits of a crime, instrumentalities used in committing it
and contraband are property in which the state has historically
been deemed to have a sufficient interest to justify seizure. 63
The state probably has sufficient interest in the prevention of
crime to seize something intended for use in committing a crime.
There may be other interests which the state might assert in a
59. For example, a typewriter used to write an extortion note would be a
means by which a crime was committed, and thus subject to seizure. However,
if a defendant were charged with tax evasion, a $10,000 IBM typewriter might
be merely evidence that the defendant spent more than he reported, and thus not
su'bject to seizure.
60. 263 U.S. 217, 235 (1960).
61. 86 Sup. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966).
62. Id. at 1834: "Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human
body rather than with state interferences with property relationships or private
papers-houses, papers, and effects'-we write on a clean slate. Limitations
on the kinds of property which may be seized under warrant, as distinct from the
procedures for search and the permissible scope of search are not instructive in
this context."
63. See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 11.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926)
"It is likely that the admitted power to seize the fruits, or the tools, or crime,
itself rests upon a very ancient basis .... At any rate, it is very carefully cir-
cumscribed in the Search Warrant Act . . . itself..... The pursuit of a thief
on hue and cry was a civil as well as criminal remedy, and the captors retook
the booty and in early times themselves did execution; the tool or other object
which killed a man was deodand and forfeit; a burglar's kit or a counterfeiter's
plate have never been property in the ordinary sense, any more than liquor since
the enactment of section 25. Ruder times liad ruder remedies, but the power to
seize such chattels probably descends from notions which have long since lost
their rational foundation, and, while the method has changed, the substance re-
mains."
1966]
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thing in order to seize it,64 for the language in Gouled v. United
States6 5 is broad enough to allow this possibility. What these
interests may be has yet to be determined.
The class of contraband, or things the possession of which is
a crime, is self-explanatory. 6 The mere evidence rule itself ap-
pears not to limit the kinds of things which the government
might render seizable by banning, if the statute making posses-
sion of the thing illegal were otherwise constitutional. Fruits
of a crime are physical objects that the criminal obtains by com-
mitting the offense. It has been noted that where the criminal
does not seek to obtain a physical thing by committing the crime,
there would be no fruits of it."'
The class of instrumentalities obviously includes weapons
used to commit murder, a car used to escape, or a note ordering
a teller to surrender cash. However, the courts have extended
this class so far that few things possessed by the defendant when
committing a crime would be excluded from the class and yet
64. See Gouled v. United 'States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1920) : "While the con-
tents of this paper are not given, it is impossible to see how the Government could
have such an interest in such a paper that under the principles of law stated it
would have the right to take it into its possession to prevent injury to the public
from its use . . . (emphasis added).
"It is not difficult, as we have said, to imagine how an executed written con-
tract might be an important agency or instrumentality in the bribing of a public
servant and in perpetrating frauds upon the Government so that it would have
a legitimate and important interest in seizing such a paper in order to prevent
further frauds." (Emphasis added.)
See also FED. R. CRlM. P. rule 41(b), which allows issuing warrants to search
for and seize things "designed or intended for use . . . as the means of com-
mitting a criminal offense."
65. It condemns only the seizure of things in which the government's sole
interest is its use in evidence, implying that if there were any other interest
which it might assert, the seizure would he valid.
66. The following things have been held to fall within the category of contra-
band: illegal drugs (Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)) ; illegal liquor
(Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)); altered draft cards (Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)); altered stamps (United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)) ; illegally-possessed ration coupons (Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)).
67. See Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 Go. L.J.
593 (1966). The concept has been extended to allow seizure of a bankbook record
ing the deposit of illegally obtained funds in United States v. Howard, 138 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Md. 1956), and of things purchased with stolen money, United
States v. Moore, 107 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The fruit of a crime is often
money, see United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d .949 (2d Cir. 1958). In United
States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961) the court did not extend the con-
cept of fruits to an account of a particularly brutal murder written by the de-
fendant who was charged with interstate transportation of kidnapped persons.
In Mathews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1943), the court ruled that an
address book containing evidence of a bankrupt's concealment of valuable assets
was a fruit, since federal law makes it illegal for anyone to conceal any property
belonging to a bankrupt, and the book itself was such property.
COMMENTS
be relevant evidence.68 For example, in United States v. Guido,69
the defendant in the course of a robbery left a distinctive heel
print, and a federal appellate court ruled that the shoes worn
during the robbery were a means of committing the crime.
"If, during a robbery, a robber had a gun in his hand and
wore a mask and gloves, the latter to prevent finger prints,
defendant, apparently, would concede that such articles could
be seized in a search incidental to a lawful arrest. However,
defendant insists that shoes worn during a robbery do not
come within that category.
"It is not logical to place in different categories a mask
and a hat which might have been worn and pulled down
upon the face of the robber to make identification more dif-
ficult. It is likewise difficult to place in different categories
a pair of gloves worn on the hands and a pair of shoes worn
on the feet. Surely the latter would facilitate a robber's get-
away and would not attract as much public attention as a
robber fleeing bare-footed from the scene of the hold-up. ' 70
Clothing worn by a defendant is frequently seized when it has
been stained with blood of a victim. The reasoning in Guido
68. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) false birth certificates
were held instrumentalities of the crime of espionage, since they could help the
defendant pass as an American citizen. Lower federal courts have held the fol-
lowing to be instrumentalities: records of'the earnings of prostitutes (United
States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962) ); bills, records, and a check book
used in carrying on illegal gambling (United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617
(7th Cir. 1960)); money found in a gambling establishment (United States v.
Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. 'a. 1959)) ; material promoting the sale of
obscene literature (United States v. Klaw, 227 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
see contra United States v. Loft on Sixth Floor of Bldg., 182 F. Supp. 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) ) ; papers with notes on the cost of living used in preparing a
fraudulent tax form (United States v. Stern, 255 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ;
Gilbert v. United States, 291 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1961) ) ; machines used to pre-
pare records of illegal business (Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1933) ) ; a list of smuggled goods necessary to the commission of the crime of
smuggling (Landon v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936)).
The following have been held not to be instrumentalities: an address book
where the crime charged was harboring a fugitive (United States v. Lerner, 100
F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1961) ) ; a handkerchief bearing "tangible evidence
of a perverted act" (Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. 1958);
a letter soliciting purchasers of obscene literature (United States v. Loft on
Sixth Floor of Bldg., 182 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; see contra, United
States v. Klaw, 227 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); notes on cost of living
used in preparing fraudulent tax forms (Gilbert v. United States, 291 F.2d 586
(9th Cir. 1961), reversed on other grounds, 370 U.S. 650; United States v. Stern,
255 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)) ; a diary and notes of phone numbers and
of meetings in prosecution for tax evasion (United States v. Stern, 225 F. Supp.
187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
69. 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied.
70. Id. at 3-4.
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would permit seizure of any clothing the perpetrator of the
crime wore during its commission as an instrumentality. How-
ever, not Guido, but Morton v. United States7 1 is cited for the
proposition that such blood-stained garments are seizable.72 But
in Morton the Court did not consider the applicability of the
mere evidence rule to the seizure, the defendant conceded that
his clothes could be seized from his closet by an officer mak-
ing a lawful arrest, but denied that an arrest had been made
at the time of the search. 73
Rarely, if ever, has the mere evidence rule been applied to
bar the seizure of intangible evidence. In On Lee v. United
States the Supreme Court indicated that the fourth amendment
and Gouled applied only to tangible evidence. 4 Despite On Lee
one appellate court has implied that the mere evidence rule
might bar the seizure of intangible evidence.7 5 Also, in Wong
Sun v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment protected intangible verbal evidence as well as tan-
gible physical evidence against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. 76 Wong Sun might serve as the basis for reconsidering
Olmstead v. United States" in which the Court held that wire-
tapping was not contrary to the fourth amendment, because the
71. 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
72. See State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 203 A.2d 185 (1965).
73. 147 F.2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1945) : "Appellant properly conceded that ail
officer making a lawful arrest on a criminal charge may take such articles as
may reasonably be used as evidence; but here, he says there was no arrest on a
criminal charge at the time the articles were taken."
74. 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952) : "Petitioner relies on cases relating to the more
common and clearly distinguishable problems raised where tangible property is
unlawfully seized. Such unlawful seizure may violate the Fourth Amendment,
even though the entry itself was by subterfuge or fraud rather than force, United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (the au-
thority of the latter case is sharply limited by Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 463). But such decisions are inapposite in the field of mechanical or
electronic devices designed to overhear or intercept conversation, at least where
access to the listening post was not obtained by illegal methods."
75. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
76. 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) : "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred
from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result
of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the over-
hearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of
'papers and effects.' "
77. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) : "The Amendment itself shows that the search
is to be of material things- the person, the house, his papers of his effects. The
description in the warrant necessary to make the proccding lawful, is that it
must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
"The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone messages as
of mailed sealed letters. The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the
use of the sense of hearing and that only."
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fourth only protected against searches and seizures of material
things.7" Statements overheard by electronic eavesdropping
would usually be communicative mere evidence, except when
made in furtherance of a crime, in which case they would be
instrumentalities. Application of the mere evidence rule would
mean that seizure of such statements would be unconstitutional.
The Policies Underlying the Mere Evidence Rule
As noted before, the mere evidence rule has its constitutional
roots in both the fifth and fourth amendments. An examination
of the policies underlying these amendments reveals that the
mere evidence rule is not one rule, but two. One must distinguish
between the rule in Gouled condemning the seizure of all mere
evidence on the basis of the fourth amendment, and the rule
in Boyd condemning the seizure of a man's papers on the basis
of the fifth amendment as well as the fourth.
In Schmerber v. California9 the Supreme Court held that
the privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused
only from being compelled to testify against himself, or other-
wise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature."' 0 The Court stated:
"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an
accused's communications, whatever form they might take,
and the compulsion of responses which are also communica-
tions, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce
one's papers .... (Boyd cited) .... On the other hand, both
federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no
protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for iden-
tification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance,
to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction
which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is
that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communica-
tions' or 'testimony', but that compulsion which makes a sus-
78. In Olnistead v. United States the Court objected to extending the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment to telephone communications on the ground that
there was no search, as well as no seizure. One might point out that in Boyd v.
United States there was no search, strictly speaking, and yet the seizure was
condemned by the Fourth Amendment, even without a trespass on the premises
of the defendant.




pect or accused the source of real or physical evidence does
not violate it."'
If one considers the papers which a man has written as them-
selves communicative, the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination bars the seizure of such papers; but it does
not prevent the seizure of other types of mere evidence. A rule
restricting seizure of mere evidence other than papers must rest
upon the fourth amendment alone. Gouled v. United States in-
vokes the fifth amendment only as a basis for the exclusionary
rule; the court condemns the actual seizure on the basis of the
fourth amendment itself.
The rationale for the rule against seizure of papers is thus
separable from that underlying the rule against seizure of other
types of mere evidence. Both the fourth and the fifth amend-
ments may be said to protect the individual's right to privacy,
but not in the same way. The fifth amendment protects the in-
dividual in the privacy of his thoughts, the fourth amendment
protects him in the privacy of his home or office. When an indi-
vidual's thoughts have been committed to paper, both amend-
ments join to prevent the seizure of that paper.
In Schmerber, after finding that a blood test did not violate
the fifth amendment, the Court stated that once the fifth was
found inapplicable it assumed that "the Fourth Amendment's
proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as
such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the cir-
cumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." 2 If
the Court's reasoning applies generally, then the Gouled rule
should not bar the seizure of non-communicative mere evidence
in all circumstances.
The Supreme Court has stated that the policy underlying
the fourth amendment is protection of the individual's right to
privacy from undue police interference.8 3 In Boyd v. United
States the Court determined that the drafters of the amend-
81. Id. at 1832.
82. Id. at 1834.
83. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949): "The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police -which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society."; and also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961): "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the State, through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth it is enforceable against them -by the same sanction of exclusion as is
used against the Federal Government."
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ment intended to proscribe general searches.8 4 Where a war-
rant has been issued, the constitutional requirement that the
thing to be seized be specified, together with the requirement
that warrants be issued only upon probable cause, suffices to
prevent general exploratory searches. Where no search warrant
has been issued, or the thing to be seized is not described in the
warrant, the mere evidence rule takes the place of the specificity
requirement in narrowing the scope of the search. It narrows
the scope by removing the motive for a general search, since
the police cannot seize the mere evidence they find, there is little
reason to search for it.
The mere evidence rule has been criticized as based on no-
tions of protecting property irrelevant to the modern era. It is
true that the rule operates to protect an individual's property;
Boyd v. United States"5 and Entick v. Carrington6 both reflect
a deep-seated belief in the sanctity of private property. But it
does not follow that the mere evidence rule is no longer viable.
To the extent that it is based on the fourth amendment, it has
roots in a constitutional recognition of the right to private prop-
erty. That amendment provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated ..
"Houses, papers, and effects" are property and will be pro-
tected by the fourth amendment unless it is repealed, whatever
the ideological fashions of the day may be.
Searches Under Warrant Specifying the Mere
Evidence To Be Seized
The fifth amendment, together with the fourth, prohibits
issuing a warrant to seize private papers written by a suspect.
However, the fifth amendment itself does not proscribe warrants
84. 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
85. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), where the Court speaks of the individuals
"indefeasible right of ...private property," as being violated 'by a paper search.
86. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765) : "The great end, for which men en-
tered into society, was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred
and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged
by some public law for the good of the whole. . . .By the laws of England, every
invasion of private property is a trespass ...
"Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection;
and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet
where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand considerable damages
in that respect."
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for other mere evidence. The mere evidence rule need not be
invoked to prevent general searches if the warrant specifies the
evidence to be seized; the suspect in such cases would have full
benefit of the specificity requirement to protect him. Therefore
the mere evidence rule should not prevent the issuing of war-
rants to seize anything, other than private papers, that would be
relevant evidence.
Permitting warrants for specific mere evidence can be recon-
ciled with Gouled, if that case be properly limited. The warrants
in that case specified something other than the things seized.
Hence Gouled was not a case where a warrant was issued for
specified mere evidence. If Gouled is so construed, there is no
case deciding whether warrants for specific mere evidence are
constitutional. None has arisen between Gouled v. United States
and Mapp v. Ohio,"' because federal statutes have not authorized
such warrants . 8  One must admit that the language used in
Gouled is broad enough to condemn issuing such warrants. How-
ever, the broad language was not necessary to the decision and
Gouled should be limited to cases where the thing seized was
not specified in a warrant. The statement in Gouled that "there
is no special sanctity in papers ... to render them immune from
search and seizure if only they fall within the scope of the cases
in which other property may be seized"' 9 should be construed
as limiting the Boyd rule to allow seizure of papers used as a
means of committing a crime, a limitation implicit in Boyd.
Searches Under Warrant Not Specifying the
Mere Evidence Seized
When the entry is under a lawful search warrant, but the
mere evidence seized is not specified in that warrant, two theo-
ries support finding the seizure illegal. One can hold the seizure
invalid on the ground that the specificity clause of the fourth
87. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp held the fourth amendment applicable to the
states.
88. The first federal statute on the subject was 40 Stat. 228 (1917). It is
little different from present FED. R. CRIm. P1. rule 41(b) which provides:
"A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any prop-
erty.
"(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or
"(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means
of committing a criminal offense; or
"(3) Possessed, controlled, or designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 957."
89. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
COMMENTS
amendment prohibits any "seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another." This seems to be the position taken by the
Supreme Court in Marron v. United States.10 If that approach
is taken, there is, of course, no need for the mere evidence rule.
However, another Supreme Court case91 has been read to mean
that an officer who enters under a lawful search warrant may
seize other things that he happens upon in the normal course of
his search.9 2 Recently the Supreme Court expressly reserved
decision on the question whether contraband may be seized in
the course of a search under a warrant not specifying itY3 Sev-
eral appellate courts have held that there are circumstances in
which things not specified in the warrant may be seized.9 4 One
of these cases quoted the statement of the mere evidence rule in
Harris v. United States as controlling.9 5
If seizure of something not specified in the search warrant
is allowed, the fourth amendment and Gouled should limit the
kinds of things seizable. Gouled itself applied the mere evidence
rule in those circumstances. Some limitation is necessary to
prevent a special search from changing into a general one; not
applying the Gouled rule would greatly weaken the specificity
requirement.
Warrantless Searches
Policy underlying the fourth amendment requires that the
Gouled rule bar the seizure of all mere evidence where the search
is incidental to an arrest, or otherwise without a search warrant,
unless the mere evidence is found on the arrestee's person. The
specificity requirement of the fourth amendment cannot protect
the individual's privacy from intrusion by the police where there
is no warrant to contain the specification. Searches without a
warrant should not give the police any greater power than
searches with a warrant. Without the mere evidence rule to sub-
90. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
91. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
92. In Steele a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of whiskey, and
other intoxicating liquors were seized, and the Court upheld the seizure. Judge
Learned Hand, in United States v. Kirschenblatt interpreted Steele to mean that
"officers, once in under a search warrant, are not confined to the contraband
specified in it." 16 F.2d 202, 203 (1926).
93. Staiiford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965).
94. Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964) ; United States v.
Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962).
95. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1962).
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stitute for the specificity requirement, the police would have
greater power to search and seize without a warrant than with
one.
96
If the seizure of mere evidence in a warrantless search were
allowed, police officers would be encouraged to by-pass the pro-
cedural difficulties of obtaining a search warrant by arresting
the accused on the premises which they wish to search. Appli-
cation to such searches of the rule barring the seizure of all
mere evidence would encourage the police to obtain warrants.
The individual's privacy would be better protected if the prac-
tice of obtaining search warrants was thus encouraged.
Applicability of the Mere Evidence Rule to the States
Although cases applying the mere evidence rule have spoken
in terms of the fourth and fifth amendments, courts in two
states have rejected the proposition that the rule is binding
upon them. A New York trial court held the rule inapplicable
to the states on the ground that it was no longer applied.97 The
California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in People
v. Thayer."' Chief Justice Traynor found that the mere evidence
rule's claim to constitutional status rests solely upon Gouled
v. United States, whose authority is questionable on several
grounds. The Court noted that under Ker v. California99 the
states may still give their own interpretation to the reasonable-
ness requirement of the fourth amendment to some extent. The
Court expressed doubt that "such a dubious technical require-
ment will be imposed on the states." 100
Several states have indicated acceptance of the mere evidence
rule in dicta.1 0' The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted it,
90. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932), the Court
stated: -[T]he authority of officers to search one's house or place of business
contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant of arrest
certainly is not greater than that conferred by a search warrant issued upon ade-
quate proof and sufficiently describling the premises and the things sought to be
obtained."
97. People v. Carroll, 38 Misc.2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1963).
98. 63 Cal.2d 635, 408 P.2d 108 (1965), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 1342 (1966).
99. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
100. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal.2d 635, 642, 408 P.2d 108, 112 (1965).
101. See Commonwealth v. Czajkowski, 198 Pa. Super. 511, 182 S.E.2d 298
(1962) ; Hernandez v. State, 153 Colo. 316, 385 P.2d 996 (1963) ; State v. Chinn,
231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962). Virginia has amended the statute allowing
the issuance of search warrants to conform with the Gouled rule. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.1-84 (Supp. 1964). Florida adopted the rule well before iapp. See Church
v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So.2d 164 (1942).
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but limited to private papers. In State v. Bisaccia, Justice Wein-
traub wrote:
"There is a marked difference between private papers
and other objects in terms of the underlying value the
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. As we have said, pri-
vate papers are almost inseparable from the privacy and
security of the individual. To browse among them in search
of anything inculpatory involves an exploratory search in-
distinguishable from the search under the general warrant
which the Fourth Amendment intended to outlaw. . . . In-
deed even a search for a specific, identified paper may in-
volve the same rude intrusion if . . . it leads to an examina-
tion of all of a man's private papers. Hence it is under-
standable that some adjustment may be needed, and presum-
ably it is to that end that a search may not be made among
a man's papers for a document which has evidential value
alone."', 2
In Ker v. California'0 3 the Court distinguished between cases in
which it held evidence inadmissible on the basis of the fourth
amendment and those in which it exercised its supervisory power
over the lower federal courts. States are bound by the former, but
not by the latter. The Court recognized that states could develop
their own rules concerning searches and seizures; however, it
stated that determinations by state courts that searches and
seizures were reasonable would be "respected only insofar as
consistent with federal constitutional guarantees," as determined
by the "'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amend-
ment and in opinions of this Court applying that Amendment. ' 10 4
In Malloy v. Hogan'0 5 the Supreme Court held that the federal
fifth amendment standards are binding upon the states, and
enforceable by exclusionary rule. It is submitted that an ex-
amination of the language used by the Supreme Court in Boyd
v. United States and Gouled v. United States indicates these de-
cisions are based upon the Constitution, and not upon the court's
supervisory power. The merits of the decisions may be doubtful,
one may view the mere evidence rule as a hypertechnicality; but
the language used by the Supreme Court leaves little doubt that
the rule is a constitutional one.
102. 45 N.J. 504, 515, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (1965).
103. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
104. Id. at 33.
105. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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The Court has frequently cited Boyd in its decisions inter-
preting the Constitution. 10 6 The authority of the holding of Boyd
that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids compulsory
production of an individual's private papers, and that the fourth
amendment likewise renders such a seizure unreasonable has
never been impeached. Boyd should render any statute purport-
ing to give the police authority to seize a man's private papers
void. In order to hold such a seizure valid, the Supreme Court
would need to overrule Boyd. It is unlikely that it will do so.
To hold valid the seizure of non-communicative mere evidence
in the course of a search beyond or without a search warrant,
the Supreme Court would need to overrule Gouled. It is more
likely to overrule Gouled than Boyd, for it has not employed
Gouled to hold a seizure unconstitutional since 1932,107 and has
avoided applying the Gouled rule by construing it quite nar-
rowly. 0
Application to Louisiana
If Boyd were held binding upon the states, application of
article 161 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure to issue a
warrant for the seizure of a man's private papers would be un-
constitutional. Consistently with Boyd, however, one could issue
warrants to seize non-communicative mere evidence, such as a
bloody shirt. There would be little adverse effect upon the prac-
tical administration of criminal justice since "it is seldom that
one finds a document containing evidence of a crime which was
nbt at one time used in its commission."'' 10 However the Boyd
rule would strengthen the security of Louisianians in the privacy
of their puiely personal papers.
If Gouled were held applicable to the states, it would not
adversely affect the practical administration of criminal justice,
if confined to its proper sphere and applied only in searches
beyond or without a warrant. The provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure allowing issuance of warrants for specified
mere evidence would be unaffected by Gouled.110 The article
106. For example, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
108. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) and Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting in both).
109. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1926).
110. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 161, 162 (1966).
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imposing upon police officers the duty to seize all incriminating
evidence about the person arrested"' would be valid only insofar
as the seizure incidental to arrest was from the person. To seize
other non-communicative mere evidence within the control of
an arrestee an officer would need a search warrant.
It is submitted that applying the Gouled rule to bar issuance
of warrants for non-communicative mere evidence would be un-
desirable. Such an application would afford the individual little
protection against unreasonable searches, but it could well
hamper effective enforcement of the law.
W. Thomas Tate
111. Id. art. 225.
